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TREATING A VESSEL LIKE A HOME FOR
PURPOSES OF CONDUCTING A SEARCH
Millions of mariners plying United States coastal and inland
waters may be unaware that under current statutory and deci-
sional law, their vessels may be boarded and inspected at will by
Coast Guard and customs officers. Two recent United States Su-
preme Court cases indicate the Court is prepared to go one step
further and authorize the full warrantless search of a vessel sub-
sequent to a lawful, random boarding, even in the absence of an
articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. This Comment argues that
the creation of a new "maritime safety and document inspection"
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement and
probable cause standard would be an unprecedented and unjusti-
fied infringement on the constitutional rights of individual marin-
ers. Because a mariner's home is often his vessel, this Comment
proposes that a warrant should be required to search a vessel's
living areas when it reasonably appears the vessel is being used as
a home.
INTRODUCTION
An individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures is a basic tenet of the United States Constitution.' The con-
stitutionally preferred method of conducting searches and seizures is
judicial review of contemplated police actions and issuance of a
search warrant before a search is conducted.' Searches conducted
without prior judicial approval are unreasonable per se under the
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
The judicial warrant has a significant role to play in that it provides the de-
tached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement of-
ficer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
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fourth amendment except in a few specific, well-established excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.'
Recently, government efforts to prevent the smuggling of illegal
drugs into this country by sea have been significantly expanded.4 The
success of these efforts has resulted in a dramatic increase in smug-
gling-related arrests and seizures of property and drugs,5 producing
numerous cases involving the constitutionality of maritime searches
and seizures.'
Absent a border crossing,7 the circuits disagree about fourth
amendment requirements in the maritime context." In an attempt to
resolve this conflict, the United States Supreme Court recently con-
sidered two cases involving the random boarding and warrantless
search of a vessel9 on domestic waters10 by law enforcement officers
conducting a routine document check.
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez1 involved the constitution-
ality of a customs agent's "suspicionless" boarding of a forty-foot
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions referred to are
set forth in the following cases: Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (emergency
circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to a lawful
arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (loss or destruc-
tion of evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (border search and
movable vehicles). See also Comment, The Expanding Scope of Warrantless Automo-
bile Searches: United States v. Ross, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 457 (1983) (discusses re-
cent developments in the search incident to arrest and movable vehicles exceptions).
4. See Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1983, § I, at 1, col. 4 (report of June 17,
1983 Washington press conference given by Vice President George Bush to announce the
formation of five additional narcotics interdiction task forces enlisting the services of the
Air Force, Army, Navy, and the CIA in the war on international trafficking).
5. The task forces mentioned supra note 4 are patterned after the highly success-
ful "Operation Florida," which has resulted in a "marked increase" in smuggling-related
arrests and $4.5 billion in drug seizures since its inception in February, 1982. Id. at 20,
col. 3.
6. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 8, 23.
7. The maritime border search cases are discussed infra note 23.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1978) (not
even a "modicum of suspicion" required to either stop or search vessels within the three-
mile limit); United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 807, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (vessels
"presumed to bear persons or cargo subject to customs enforcement procedures" may be
searched without warrant, probable cause, or suspicion, but not every vessel in American
waters is subject to customs scrutiny); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 665 (9th
Cir. 1976) (absent probable cause or consent, search based solely on statute authorizing
document checks "is unreasonable if it sweeps more broadly than the Fourth Amend-
ment allows.")
9. The term "'[v]essel' includes every description of watercraft, other than a sea-
plane on the water, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on the
water." 46 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (1971). This Comment addresses only those vessels that
serve as an actual (temporary or permanent) dwelling for their operators. See infra text
accompanying notes 124-140.
10. The term "domestic waters" means all waters within the three-mile limit, the
functional equivalent of the international border in maritime cases. United States v.
Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1979).
11. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
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sailboat on inland waters leading to the open sea. The agent boarded
to conduct a document check pursuant to 19 U.S.C. section
1581(a).12 The Court held the boarding was "reasonable" under the
fourth amendment, even though the agent lacked a reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity prior to boarding. 3 The validity of the ves-
sel's subsequent search was not contested, and the Court did not ad-
dress the issue."'
The same day Villamonte-Marquez was decided, the Court issued
a per curiam memorandum decision in Florida v. Casal15 dismissing
the writ of certiorari as "improvidently granted" because the judg-
ment below rested on "independent and adequate state grounds."1 6
In Casal, Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion emphasiz-
ing that the Court had decided that Florida law, not federal law nor
any Supreme Court decision, was responsible for the "untoward re-
sult" in the case.1 7 Burger's statements imply that probable cause is
not required to justify the full warrantless search of a vessel subse-
quent to a lawful, random boarding for routine document check, al-
though neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have yet
12. The statute provides in relevant part:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle
at any place in the United States or within the customs waters. . . and examine
the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search
the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or
cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use
all necessary force to compel compliance.
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). Coast Guard officers are given similar powers under 14
U.S.C. § 89(a):
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States
has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of
laws of the United States. For such purposes, [Coast Guard] officers may at any
time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of
any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the
ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and
use all necessary force to compel compliance.
14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982).
13. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
14. In Villamonte-Marquez, the Court was concerned only with the "more narrow
issue" of the constitutionality of the "suspicionless boarding of the vessel for a documen-
tation inspection." Id. at 2575, n.2, 2577, n.3.
15. 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983).
16. Id. at 3100-3101.
17. Id. at 3101. The "untoward result" was that convicted drug smugglers were
released because the Florida Supreme Court relied on the state constitution and Florida
precedent to conclude the warrantless search of a vessel subsequent to a boarding for a
safety and document check must be supported by a showing the officers had probable
cause to believe that a crime was being or about to be committed. See State v. Casal,
410 So. 2d 152, 155-56 (Fla. 1982).
squarely confronted the issue."8
Recognizing the Burger Court's search and seizure decisions as
part of a "continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures,"19 Chief Justice Bur-
ger's statements in Casal indicate the Court may soon create a new
"maritime safety and document inspection" exception to the fourth
amendment's probable cause standard and warrant requirement.2
Considering the Villamonte-Marquez Court's literal interpretation
of 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a), the Court appears willing to grant
Coast Guard and customs officials the authority to randomly board
and fully search any vessel at any time anywhere in the United
States without a warrant or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
This Comment discusses the constitutional standards that should
govern the warrantless search of the private areas of a vessel by of-
ficers conducting a routine safety and document inspection.2 1 This
Comment suggests the Court should refrain from creating a new
"maritime safety and document inspection" exception to fourth
amendment requirements. Absent a reasonable suspicion of a law vi-
olation, the Court should restrict warrantless searches of the private
areas of a vessel to the legitimate scope of safety and document in-
spections,22 or to situations falling within the border search'3 or
18. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2575, n.2,
2577, n.3 (1983); United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 773, n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087, n.26 (5th
Cir. 1980).
19. 103 S. Ct. at 2591 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
567 (1975)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. At least one district court has taken this approach to maritime searches and
seizures. See United States v. Whitmore, 536 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D.C. Me. 1982).
21. Routine safety and document inspections serve as a common, judicially-ac-
cepted pretext for random Coast Guard boardings of vessels to detect violations of all
United States law. See, e.g., United States v. Whitmore, 536 F. Supp. 1284 (D.C. Me.
1982); United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 451(1982); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980). Customs officials alone
conducted more than 4,400 boardings of vessels for document checks on inland United
States waters over a two-year period in 1980 and 1981. See Los Angeles Times, June 18,
1983, § I, at 20, col. 1.
22. The record in United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), estab-
lished, by affidavit of a Coast Guard commander, that the standard safety inspection of a
pleasure vessel consists of the following:
(1) Stopping and boarding of the boat.(2) Checking boat registration papers and personal identification of the boat
owner.
(3) Inspecting the boat for number, condition and storage of life jackets and fire
extinguishers.
(4) Inspecting the engine for backfire flame arrestor, closed compartments for
proper ventilation ducts, and bilges for spilled oil or fuel to prevent explosion
and fire.
Id. at 359.
23. The "border search" exception to the warrant requirement and probable cause
standard of the fourth amendment is the exception most widely applied in the maritime
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other well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement.24
When it reasonably appears a vessel is being used as a home, the
vessel's living areas should be entitled to the same guarantees
against warrantless entry and search that the fourth amendment
gives to conventional residences.25 Therefore, this Comment proposes
that a search warrant should be required to search the living areas of
a vessel when it reasonably appears the vessel's operators are using it
as a home.26
Villamonte-Marquez
Villamonte-Marquez involved the validity of the boarding of a
forty-foot sailboat, the Henry Morgan II, by a customs agent and a
Louisiana State Police officer, while anchored in a Louisiana ship
channel eighteen miles inland from the Gulf Coast.27 Acting on an
informant's tip that two vessels operated by foreigners were in the
area waiting to offload marijuana, the officers were patrolling the
channel when they saw the Henry Morgan II rock violently in the
wake of a passing freighter.2 8 The officers approached the vessel to
determine if she and her crew were unharmed, spotted a man on
deck, and asked him twice if he was unharmed. 29 The man merely
raised his hands and shrugged his shoulders in response to the of-
ficers' inquiries.30 Because the officers were looking for a vessel oper-
context. See, e.g., United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied
446 U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Kleinschmidt, 596 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied 444 U.S. 927 (1979); United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanley, 545
F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that leaving the country, just like entering, is a border
crossing sufficient to justify a border search); United States v. Ingham, 502 F.2d 1287
(9th Cir. 1974). In these cases, however, the courts consistently require a showing of a
reasonable suspicion that the vessel crossed the border. See United States v. Whitmire,
595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court said:
In water cases, the true border is an imaginary line three miles offshore. Though
we have not required the coast guard or customs officers to observe the vessel as
it crosses this imaginary line, our precedent generally has required that the offi-
cials have articulable facts from which they may reasonably infer that the boat
has come from international waters.
Id. at 1307 (footnotes and citations omitted). Such a showing will usually justify a full
warrantless search of the vessel. See 3 W. LA FAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 10.5(i), at
115 (Supp. 1983).
24. See supra note 3.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 134-135.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 136-138.
27. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2576 (1983).
28. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. Id.
30. Id.
ated by foreigners, because the man on deck appeared unable to un-
derstand English, and because the officers did not recognize the
home port of the Henry Morgan II as a home port of the United
States, 31 the officers boarded the vessel for a document check pursu-
ant to 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a).
While examining the vessel's documents, the officers smelled the
odor of burning marijuana.32 One of the officers looked through an
open hatch and saw burlap-wrapped bales of what later proved to be
bulk marijuana.33 The vessel's crew was arrested. A subsequent
search of the Henry Morgan II yielded some 5,800 pounds of mari-
juana. 4 At trial, defendants' motion to suppress the marijuana as
the fruit of an illegal search and seizure was denied; the crew of the
Henry Morgan II was convicted of possession and importation of
marijuana with the intent to distribute. 35 On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the ini-
tial boarding of the vessel in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of
a law violation offended the fourth amendment.38
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
boarding of the Henry Morgan 11 for a document check pursuant to
section 1581(a) was "reasonable" and therefore consistent with the
fourth amendment, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion 37
Based on the legislative history of section 1581(a),3 8 the inherent
factual differences between vessels and vehicles,39 and the limited
scope of the intrusion on fourth amendment interests compared to
the substantial governmental interests involved,40 the Court4 1 con-
cluded that suspicionless boardings of vessels for document checks on
inland waters leading to the open sea are constitutionally
permissible.'2
The following analysis of the holding and rationale in Villamonte-
Marquez is designed to determine whether the Court's reasoning
31. Id.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
33. Id.
34. The constitutionality of the warrantless search of the vessel was not contested;
the defense conceded the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances once the
officers boarded the vessel and smelled marijuana. 652 F.2d at 484.
35. Id. at 484.
36. Id. at 488.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 46 to 66.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 67 to 98.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 99 to 113.
41. Burger, C.J., and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor, joined
Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Jus-
tice Stevens joined only in Part I of the dissent written by Justice Brennan, and would
have dismissed the case as moot because the respondents had already been deported. 103
S. Ct. at 2575, 2582.
42. Id. at 2582.
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would conceivably justify the full warrantless search of a vessel sub-
sequent to a section 1581(a) boarding, even in the absence of con-
sent,43 probable cause,4" or circumstances falling within the existing
exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.4 5
History of Section 1581(a)
Section 1581(a) is a direct descendant of a similar statute enacted
by the First Congress.46 Although the Villamonte-Marquez Court
acknowledged "'no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution,' ,,47 the Court, citing longstanding precedent,48 held
that suspicionless vessel boardings are not prohibited by the fourth
amendment because the historical antecedent of section 1581(a) was
written by the same Congress that wrote the Bill of Rights.49 The
Court reasoned that the founding fathers did not consider search and
seizure activity of this kind to be "unreasonable"; therefore, suspi-
cionless vessel boardings are not embraced by the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
As the Court noted,50 however, the ancestor statute was enacted
"to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed
by law on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United
States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels." 51 Apparently, the
tariff and customs act of August 4, 1790, was intended to be a reve-
nue act, designed solely to help fill the coffers of the new-born repub-
lic in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. The legislative his-
tory of section 1581(a) does not clearly support an interpretation
that the framers intended the ancestor statute to serve as a modern
license for Coast Guard and customs agents to board and search ves-
sels on domestic waters at will to compel compliance with all Untied
States law, not just the customs laws.5
43. Consent freely given justifies a warrantless search. See 2 LA FAVE, supra note
23, § 8.1 (1978).
44. The existence of probable cause to believe a crime is being or has been com-
mitted will justify a warrantless search. See 1 LAFAvE, supra note 23, § 3.1 (1978).
45. See cases cited supra note 3.
46. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (repealed 1799).
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272 (1973)).
48. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2578-79. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977), was cited to support this argument. Id.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
51. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (repealed 1799).
52. The vast majority of vessels using United States' domestic waters today are
undocumented pleasure vessels which are exempt from customs regulation. See infra note
Close study of section 1581 (a) reveals the original statute was ap-
plicable to vessels within the twelve-mile limit only "if bound to the
United States. 5 3 Arguably, the Act was merely a border search
statute.4 Though the boarding officers were permitted access to
every part of the vessel to search for concealed dutiable goods,55
neither the warrantless search of persons or closed containers on
board, nor the seizure of the vessel itself, was authorized.56
Congress did not authorize suspicionless boardings of vessels re-
gardless of whether there had been a border crossing until the height
of Prohibition. 57 In 1922, the Sixty-Seventh Congress made two
changes in the statute: first, the right to board and search vessels
inside the twelve-mile limit was no longer restricted to inbound ves-
sels; and second, the statute was amended to give customs officers
the right to seize vessels found to be in violation of customs laws.58
In 1935, the statute was further amended to include suspicionless
boardings and searches to examine "other documents and papers" as
well as the cargo manifest.59
The history of section 1581(a) indicates the current statute has
94; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1441(3) (1982), which provides that "undocumented American
pleasure vessels not engaged in trade nor in any way violating the customs or navigation
laws of the United States and not having visited any hovering vessel" are not required to
"make entry at the customhouse."
53. The Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (repealed 1799), pro-
vided in part:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors, and
the officers of the revenue cutters herein after mentioned, to go on board of ships
or vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast
thereof, if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respective
districts, for the purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examin-
ing and searching the said ships or vessels ....
54. 103 S. Ct. at 2586, n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164-65 (repealed 1799).
56. Id. The statute prescribed certain procedures to be followed subsequent to
boarding:
[I]t shall be the duty of said officer to take a particular account of every such
box, trunk, cask or package, and the marks, if any there be, and a description
thereof; and if he shall judge proper to put a seal or seals on every such box,
chest, trunk, cask or package; and such account shall be by him forwarded to
the collector of the district to which such ship or vessel is bound. And if upon
arrival at her port of entry, the boxes, trunks, chests, casks or packages so de-
scribed, or any of them shall be missing, or if the seals put thereon be broken,
the master ... of such ship or vessel shall forfeit and pay for every such box,
trunk, chest, cask or package so missing, or of which the seals shall be broken,
two hundred dollars.
Id. (emphasis added).
57. The eighteenth amendment to the Constitution was enacted January 28, 1919.
See 40 Stat. 1941.
58. The Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 581, 42 Stat. 858, 979, made a third major
change in the statute by expanding the scope of searches pursuant to manifest inspections
to include searches of persons. See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 528-29 (1927)
(Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring).
59. Act of Aug. 5, 1935, ch. 438, § 581, 49 Stat. 521.
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been expanded far beyond the intentions of the founding fathers.
The original statute limited suspicionless boardings and searches of
vessels to inspections of inbound vessels to ensure all dutiable goods
on board were listed on the ship's manifest. During Prohibition, how-
ever, the statute was significantly expanded "to discover and prevent
intended smuggling." 60 Seizures of vessels were authorized for the
first time, as were warrantless searches of persons and closed con-
tainers. Today, as in the 1920's and '30's, "the need to deter or ap-
prehend smugglers is great."61 Reacting to this need, the Supreme
Court has held the descendant of the original act now authorizes the
random boarding of all vessels on United States waters to compel
compliance with all United States law.
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have
held suspicionless searches of a vessel's private areas are similarly
authorized, the broad language of section 1581(a)62 and recent dicta
by the Chief Justice63 make such a holding foreseeable. However,
because the act as modernly interpreted and applied bears slight re-
semblance to the ancestor statute, the Court should reexamine the
"impressive historical pedigree"' " of section 1581(a) to determine
whether the First Congress "clearly authorized" 65 the full warrant-
less search of a vessel on domestic waters absent a border crossing or
reasonable suspicion of a law violation. Regardless of the founding
fathers' intent, such a search should be held unconstitutional because
"neither longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevail-
ing practice justifies a constitutional violation." 66
Inherent Differences Between Vessels and Vehicles
The inherent difference between vessel navigation on inland water-
ways and vehicular traffic on highways is perhaps the strongest justi-
fication given by the Villamonte-Marquez Court for treating suspi-
cionless boardings of vessels' for safety and document checks
differently from random stops of vehicles for license and registration
checks.6" Unlike vehicles, vessels can travel in any direction; vessels
60. See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 507 (1927) (discussing § 581 of the
Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 979).
61. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 (1983).
62. See supra note 12.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
64. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2577-78 (1983).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566, n.19 (1975).
67. Such stops are unconstitutional except when at least a reasonable suspicion
need not follow roads as vehicles must do.68 The constitutionally pre-
ferred alternatives to random stops such as roadblocks 9 and fixed
checkpoints70 are impractical on waterways leading to the open
sea,7 1 "since boats cannot come to a complete stop and line up be-
hind each other on the water as cars can on roads. '72
Other preferable alternatives to random stops such as annual
dockside inspections are similarly impractical because safety and
equipment regulations generally apply to vessels only when in use.78
Requiring Coast Guard officers to have a reasonable suspicion of
noncompliance with safety regulations prior to boarding would ar-
guably frustrate the regulatory scheme, because most safety and
equipment violations can only be detected once the vessel is
boarded.74 In Villamonte-Marquez, the Court concluded this lack of
a practical alternative to random boardings justifies treating vessels
different from vehicles to accomplish the "obviously essential" gov-
ernment interests in enforcing maritime safety and document
regulations."5
However, practical alternatives to completely random boardings
and searches exist which counterbalance any unique law enforce-
ment problems presented by the maritime context. Though it may be
impossible to erect roadblocks at sea, maritime checkpoint opera-
tions have been successful. 78 As illustrated by United States v. Wat-
son77 and United States v. Harper,78 systematic inspections of all
vessels under a prescribed length at established checkpoints on well-
traveled sea lanes are an effective method of maritime law enforce-
ment. Furthermore, as noted in Villamonte-Marquez, maritime coin-
based on articulable facts exists that the driver of the vehicle is unlicensed or that the
vehicle is not registered in compliance with state law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979).
68. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2580 (1983); State v.
Casal, 410 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982).
69. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permanent
Border Patrol checkpoint on interstate highway near San Clemente, California).
71. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2580 (1983).
72. State v. Casal, 410 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982).
73. United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
451 (1982); United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1979).
74. United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
451 (1982); accord, United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
76. See 3 LA FAVE, supra note 23, § 10.5(i), at 111 (Supp. 1983).
77. 678 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982) (suspicionless
boarding of pleasure vessel on high seas pursuant to administrative plan to board and
inspect all vessels under 200 feet in length found in specific "windows" or "corridors" at
established points in the Pacific held constitutional).
78. 617 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1980) (nondiscretionary stop and boarding of all
vessels under 250 feet in length passing checkpoint in Caribbean sea lanes upheld).
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merce on inland United States waters eventually funnels into rivers
and canals, which are similar to roads and make a roadblock ap-
proach more practical.
Checkpoint operations are preferable to roving patrol stops be-
cause they are not made at "the will and the whim of the officer in
the field,"80 thereby minimizing the "'grave danger' of abuse of dis-
cretion" 81 by law enforcement officers. Checkpoint operations are
less intrusive on fourth amendment interests because operators of
vessels so boarded do not have "any sense of being singled out arbi-
trarily, as would the occupants of a car plucked from the stream of
traffic. 812
The viability of less-intrusive, nondiscretionary maritime check-
point operations obviates the Villamonte-Marquez Court's concern
that "vessels having ready access to the open sea need never come to
harbor,"'8 s thereby avoiding fixed checkpoints at various ports.8 The
existence of practical alternatives to completely random boardings
and searches of vessels makes the inherent differences between ves-
sels and vehicles alone insufficient to justify treating vessels different
from vehicles for purposes of enforcing safety and document
regulations.
Different Systems of Prescribed Outward Markings
Another justification given by the Villamonte-Marquez Court for
treating suspicionless boardings of vessels different from random
stops of vehicles is that police officers patrolling a highway can tell if
a vehicle is in compliance with state vehicle registration laws just by
looking at the vehicle's license plate and registration stickers.85 The
Court said "the numerals displayed by undocumented American
boats, are marked on the vessel at the instance of the owner," 86 and
"no comparable 'license plates' or 'stickers' are issued by the United
States or by States to vessels. 87
This distinction is inaccurate in some states, however. In Califor-
79. 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
80. United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1980).
81. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979), quoting United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1975).
82. United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
451 (1982).
83. 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979)).
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
87. Id.
nia and Florida, for example, every vessel using state waters is re-
quired to be numbered.88 Both states compel vessel owners to attach
clearly visible numbers to each side of the bow. 9 Both states also
issue vessel registration stickers, which must be clearly visible and
attached to the bow along with the identification numbers.90
Vessels registered in either California or Florida need not be
boarded to ascertain compliance with state vessel registration re-
quirements. In California, Florida, and states with comparable regu-
latory schemes, the boarding of a vessel on waters of the state in
which it is registered, 1 solely for the purposes of conducting a docu-
ment check, should be permitted only when, based on observations of
the vessel's exterior markings, a reasonable suspicion of noncompli-
ance with documentation regulations exists.
Complexity of Federal Vessel Documentation Regulations
The Villamonte-Marquez Court reasoned that different fourth
amendment standards for random stops of vehicles and suspicionless
boardings of vessels are further justified because federal vessel docu-
mentation regulations are "more extensive and more complex than
the typical state requirements for vehicle licensing."92 However,
though "vessels engaged in certain trades must obtain special li-
censes,"93 the vast majority of vessels using domestic United States
waters are undocumented pleasure vessels that are, by definition, ex-
empt from federal documentation requirements.94
The extent and type of federal vessel documentation requirements
fail to justify random boardings of undocumented vessels for docu-
ment checks. Except where the operators of a vessel are engaged in
certain highly-regulated industries such as fishing, salvaging, dredg-
88. See CAL. VEI. CODE § 9850 (West Supp. 1984); See FLA. STATS. ANN. §
327.10 (West Supp. 1983).
89. CAL. VEH. CODE § 9853.2 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 327.10
(West Supp. 1983).
90. CAL. VEH. CODE § 9853.4 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STATS. ANN. § 327.11(7)
(West Supp. 1983).
91. California state waters are defined as "all waters of the state except waters
beyond three nautical miles of any shore of the state." CAL. HAE. & NAv. CODE §
775.5(i) (Deering Supp. 1983).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81.
93. Id.
94. See 46 U.S.C. § 1452(3) (1979). As of July 29, 1983, there were 554,141
undocumented vessels registered in California alone, excluding rowboats, canoes, and
vessels less than 8 feet long propelled solely by sail. (Telephone interview with the Ves-
sels Division of the California Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, California,
September 8, 1983). California registers pleasure craft and commercial vessels up to 30
feet long as undocumented vessels. The state will also register pleasure craft up to 155
feet long and commercial vessels over 30 feet in length if the Coast Guard certifies in
writing that the vessel does not require federal documentation. CAL. VEH. CODE §
9840(g) (West Supp. 1984).
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ing, or towing,95 boardings and searches of undocumented vessels us-
ing domestic waters should be authorized only where there exists a
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts'that the vessel has or
is violating navigation or other laws," is subject to customs scru-
tiny,97 or is not in compliance with state vessel documentation
regulations.98
Scope of the Intrusion
The Villamonte-Marquez Court said maritime safety and docu-
ment inspections constitute "only a modest intrusion"99 on fourth
amendment interests because they normally involve only a brief de-
tention of the vessel while officers board, examine documents, and
inspect public areas of the vessel.100 The Court upheld the suspi-
cionless boarding of the Henry Morgan II on the grounds that "the
nature of the governmental interest in assuring compliance with doc-
umentation requirements, particularly in waters where the need to
deter or apprehend smugglers is great, are substantial; the type of
intrusion made in this case, while not minimal, is limited.' 101
The Court's emphasis on the objective government need to control
maritime smuggling insufficiently addressed the nature of the subjec-
tive intrusion involved in vessel boarding cases.10 2 This subjective in-
trusion, "the generating of concern or even fright on the part of law-
ful travelers,"103 although not dispositive,es provides guidance in
properly balancing "the government's interest in enforcing its laws
against the individual's interest in his dignity and privacy. ' '105
To effectuate vessel boardings, the Coast Guard is statutorily au-
thorized to use "all necessary force" to compel compliance with all
95. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2581 (1983).
96. "Smuggling is commonly attended by violation of the navigation laws." Maul
v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 525 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also cases
cited in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2590 fn. 11 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1441(3) (1983). See supra note 52.
98. See supra notes 88-90.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
100. Id. In the case of the Henry Morgan 1I, the intrusion was considered further
limited because the vessel was a foreign vessel; foreign vessels are subject to customs
scrutiny and a greater degree of federal regulation than are domestic vessels. Id. at 2581.
101. Id. at 2582.
102. See United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979).
103. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
104. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1979).
105. United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976).
United States law."08 Boarding parties for standard Coast Guard
safety and document inspections10 7 typically consist of three of-
ficers 0 8 armed with either a shotgun or M-16 automatic rifle in ad-
dition to sidearms. 10 9 The command of "'heave to, we're coming
aboard' "110 from an approaching Coast Guard cutter replete with
50-caliber machine gun"'1 might understandably frighten and con-
cern the Sunday sailor.
Routine Coast Guard boardings for safety and document inspec-
tions are clearly a "possibly unsettling show of authority,"' 2 consti-
tuting a significant subjective intrusion on fourth amendment inter-
ests of individual mariners. The weight of this subjective intrusion
must be properly balanced against objective government needs when
determining whether a particular police practice is permissible under
the fourth amendment.113
SUSPICIONLESS VESSEL SEARCHES
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court's balancing test was
flawed because the majority ignored the mariner's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when evaluating the scope of the intrusion involved
in maritime search and seizure situations. " 4 The Villamonte-Mar-
quez Court's emphasis on objective government needs overlooked the
significant subjective intrusiveness of routine vessel boardings; as a
result, inordinate weight was given to governmental interests at the
expense of individual fourth amendment rights. Before the suspi-
cionless search of the private living areas " 5 of a vessel using domes-
tic waters1 6 can be upheld under the fourth amendment, the Su-
106. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982). See supra note 12.
107. See supra note 22.
108. United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 451 (1982).
109. United States v. Whitmore, 536 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 n.4 (D. Me. 1982).
110. Id.
I 11. United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 451 (1982).
112. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).
113. United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2590 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. The First Circuit has authorized a suspicionless search of the closed forward
compartment of a vessel for spilled fuel as within the legitimate scope of a safety inspec-
tion. See United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1980). By comparison, the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, has held that the Coast Guard must have at least a reason-
able suspicion that contraband will be found before conducting a warrantless search of
"private" areas of the vessel's hold (United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087 (5th
Cir. 1980); however, nine judges of that court would have held that there is no legitimate
privacy interest in any part of a vessel's hold. Id. at 1087 n.25.
116. Mariners on the high seas have a lesser expectation of privacy than mariners
using domestic waters because of the expanded government interests in policing the high
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preme Court must properly balance the mariner's reasonable
expectation of privacy against the government need to control mari-
time smuggling.
The Villamonte-Marquez Court compared suspicionless vessel
boardings to random vehicle stops and concluded the inherent fac-
tual differences between vessels and vehicles justify treating vessels
differently from vehicles for purposes of conducting a safety and doc-
ument check. If the constitutionality of suspicionless vessel searches
is to be determined by comparing them to warrantless vehicle
searches,11 then the factual differences between vessels and vehicles
should also justify treating vessels different from vehicles for pur-
poses of conducting a search.
Warrantless automobile searches have traditionally been justified
on the ground there is a constitutional difference between houses and
cars: first, automobiles are inherently mobile and can be moved from
a jurisdiction before a warrant can be obtained; 1 8 and second, the
public nature of automobile travel lowers the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the vehicle's interior.1 9 However, the exi-
gent circumstance of vehicle mobility may fail to justify a warrant-
less automobile search where there is no danger the vehicle will be
moved before a warrant can be obtained. 20 Recognizing that the
primary justification for the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement is no longer vehicle mobility, the Court has held "the an-
swer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds
the automobile. '12 1
The Villamonte-Marquez Court compared vessels to vehicles be-
cause vessels, like vehicles, are inherently mobile.122 Though conceiv-
ably providing a measure of justification for treating suspicionless
searches of vessels like warrantless searches of vehicles, 23 this exi-
gency of mobility would be but one factor to be balanced against the
seas. See United States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D.
Fla. 1975), affd per curiam, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Convention on the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
84.). Furthermore, a Coast Guard stop of a vessel on the high seas is the equivalent of a
border stop and is therefore reasonable even in the absence of a suspicion of criminal
activity on board. See Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing
United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 887 (1980)).
117. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3.
118. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
119. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
120. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
121. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
122. 103 S. Ct. at 2573-75.
123. See Comment, supra note 3, at 460-61.
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in a maritime search
and seizure situation.
The main factor diminishing the expectation of privacy in a vehi-
cle is that the basic function of an automobile is the provision of
transportation; that is, vehicles "seldom serve as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects."12 By comparison, the primary
function of a vessel is often the provision of living quarters, whether
on a temporary or permanent basis. As the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals said in United States v. Cadena,125 "the ship is the sailor's
home. There is hardly the expectation of privacy even in the cur-
tained limousine or the stereo-equipped van that every mariner or
yachtsman expects aboard his vessel." 2
The notion that "a man's home is his castle" is as old as the com-
mon law.' 27 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has traditionally ac-
knowledged "the fourth amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house."128 Homes are generally inviolate from war-
rantless entry and search, except in situations where emergency cir-
cumstances such as fire,1 29 pursuit of a fleeing felon,130 or imminent
destruction of evidence 8 1 are of sufficient magnitude to justify entry
without a warrant. People who stay temporarily in hotels and motels
are afforded these same protections against warrantless entry and
search. 132 "A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such
oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure,
some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle."1 33
No less than a guest in a hotel room, a mariner aboard a vessel
should be entitled to protection against warrantless searches of tem-
porary living quarters. Though vessels are inherently mobile like ve-
hicles, they have many of the privacy characteristics of homes.
Moreover, the danger a vessel will be moved before a warrant can be
obtained is remote in situations where the vessel has been stopped
124. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
125. 588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1979).
126. Id. at 101.
127. See, e.g., Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b; 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195
(1620), cited in Amicus Curiae Brief at 7, People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief] (on file with the SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW). This
Comment's thesis is an application to the maritime context of the holding and rationale
in Carney, the argument set forth in the Amicus Brief, and the research and analysis of
Carney's attorneys embodied in their Petition for Hearing After Decision and Opinion by
the Court of Appeal [hereinafter referred to as Petition] (on file with the SAN DIEGO
LAW REVIEW).
128. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
129. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
130. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
131. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
132. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
133. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12, fn.4 (1961), quoting
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (1951) (Frank, J., dissenting).
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and boarded by armed Coast Guard officers for a routine safety and
document inspection. 3 In such a situation the issue is not the ves-
sel's mobility, but whether the vessel's occupant has manifested a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vessel's interior.135
Mariners have a greater expectation of privacy than motorists.
Accordingly, vessels are entitled to greater protection against war-
rantless entry and search than are vehicles. There is a constitutional
difference between vessels and vehicles because vessels, unlike most
vehicles, 136 often serve as a dwelling for their operators.3 7 The liv-
ing areas of a vessel should be given the same protections against
warrantless entry and search that the fourth amendment gives to
conventional residences, because a vessel, as much as a house, pro-
vides a sanctuary from unreasonable government intrusion. The fact
that a vessel is not fixed to land should not diminish its fourth
amendment status as a home. Therefore, whenever the outward ap-
pearance of a vessel would lead a reasonable person to believe it is
being used as a residence, a search warrant should be required to
search the vessel's living areas.183
CONCLUSION
Recent cases indicate the Supreme Court is ready to give govern-
ment agents carte blanche to board and search any vessel at any
time anywhere in the United States to compel compliance with all
United States law. Such an awesome grant of power would be a mis-
carriage of the founding fathers' intentions, induced by a visceral
reaction to the unique law enforcement problems presented by the
recent upsurge in maritime smuggling.
Safety and document inspections should not be a license for Coast
Guard and custom officials to randomly board and search undocu-
mented vessels on domestic waters. Examinations of public areas of
134. See supra text accompanying notes 106 to 111.
135. For example, a mariner who has closed the curtains on windows of the vessel's
living areas so that its contents are not exposed to public view has manifested a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy therein. See United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326
(9th Cir. 1980) (motor home case), cited in People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 609-10
(1983); see also Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at 13-14, fn.11; Petition, supra note 127,
at 10 (all involving motor homes).
136. In People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597 (1983), the California Supreme Court
held that a motor home is not subject to the movable vehicle exception to the warrant
requirement when it reasonably appears the vehicle serves as living quarters. Id. at 610.
137. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2588-89 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. See cases and materials cited supra notes 127, 135.
vessels boarded for safety and document inspections should be re-
stricted to the legitimate scope of such inspections. In states with
vessel documentation regulations like those of California and Flor-
ida, vessel boardings on home state waters for document checks
should be permitted only when there exists a reasonable suspicion
based on articulable facts that the vessel is not registered according
to law. Except where a vessel's operators are engaged in certain
highly regulated activities, boardings and searches of vessels on do-
mestic waters should be authorized only on a showing of reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
The Supreme Court should refrain from further limiting fourth
amendment protections by recognizing a new "maritime safety and
document inspection" exception to both the probable cause standard
and the warrant requirement. The warrant requirement "is not an
inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police
efficiency."1391 Because the living areas of a vessel are not generally
exposed to public view, they are entitled to greater protection against
warrantless entry and search than, for example, the passenger com-
partment of an automobile. The constitutionality of domestic mari-
time searches and seizures should depend on whether the individual
mariner has manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vessel's interior.
"A man's home is his castle," and "the ship is the sailor's
home.111 40 When it reasonably appears that the operators of a vessel
are using it as a home, the vessel should be given the same protec-
tion against entry and search that the fourth amendment gives to
conventional residences. Therefore, absent a border crossing, emer-
gency circumstances, or a situation falling within an existing and
applicable exception to the warrant requirement, a warrant should
be required to search a vessel's living areas.
BARRY VREVICH
139. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979), quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
140. United States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1979).
